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Abstract
The dominant story of the founding of New Zealand is a simple one of cession of sovereignty by the
indigenous Maori people to the British in the Treaty of Waitangi 1840. One notable aspect of the dominant
legal portrayals of the Treaty signing, and subsequent legal cases, is their repression of the glaring
discrepancies between the Maori version of the Treaty, signed by most Maori leaders, and the English
versions. Historical arguments suggest that this discrepancy is the result ofdeliberate deceptio.n on the
part of British missionaries translating the Treaty into Maori (Walker 1990: 9L Walker 1989: 269, Ross
1972: 20, Ross 1972 NZ]H: 140-141). I argue that this act ofdeception was necessary to the colonisation
of New Zealand, and to the formation of New Zealand as a unified nation-state. The deceptive, or
'appropriative' mistranslation (Constable 1996: 634635), of the Treatywas the performance of an ideal of
the forwardgazing (white, male) citizen who has successfully shed his history (Davidson 1997: 19, Bernal
1994: 125-127); it served both the individual interests of the citizen/subject translator and the interests of
nation-building.
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Colonising Concepts of the Good Citizen,
Law's Deceptions, and the Treaty of
Waitangi
Nan Seuffert
I. Introduction
The dominant story of the founding of New Zealand is a simple
one of cession ofsovereignty by the indigenous Maori people to
the British in the Treaty ofWaitangi 1840. One notable aspect of
the dominant legal portrayals of the Treaty signing, and
subsequent legal cases, is their repression of the glaring
discrepancies between the Maori version of the Treaty, signed by
most Maori leaders, and the English versions. Historical
arguments suggest that this discrepancy is the result of deliberate
deceptio.n on the part ofBritish missionaries translating the Treaty
into Maori (Walker 1990: 9 L Walker 1989: 269, Ross 1972:
20, Ross 1972 NZ]H: 140-141). I argue that this act ofdeception
was necessary to the colonisation of New Zealand, and to the
formation of New Zealand as a unified nation-state. The
deceptive, or 'appropriative' mistranslation (Constable 1996: 634635), ofthe Treaty was the performance ofan ideal ofthe forwardgazing (white, male) citizen who has successfully shed his history
(Davidson 1997: 19, Bernal 1994: 125-127); it served both the
individual interests of the citizen/subject translator and the
interests of nation-building.
This article traces the subsequent re-enactment of this
deceptive translation through the repression ofthe Maori version
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ofTreaty in three cases decided betwe~n 1847 and 1987 which
are pivotal in the re-production and maintenance of a unified
New Zealand. This reading foregrounds the repetitions and
absences in the law necessary for its maintenance of the fictions
oflegitimacy, separation and unity. 1 The repetition ofprecedent
opens an ethical space which is used in these pivotal cases to reenact the deceptive translation of the Treaty. The absences
paradoxically make imaginable readings that have been erased
(Pether 1998: 116), while highlighting the perpetual crisis of
these fictions) both textual and material (Bannerji 1993: 107).
This reading recasts the appropriative mistranslation of the
Treaty from part of the rough justice or motal shoddiness of the
frontier, individual opportunism, or the inexperience of 'do-ityourself diplomats' (Rice 1992: 52) to the performance of
citizenship necessary and integral to the Empire-building project
of colonisation. This act ofdeception is a strategy, reproduced at
pivotal historical moments, that serves necessary purposes of
nation building and forms part of the substance of British
colonising culture.

II. Abuses in Translation
In this section I argue that the production and legitimation of
the dominant story of the founding of New Zealand as a unified
nation-state is dependent upon the repression ofthe appropriative
mistranslation of the Treaty of Waitangi into Maori. In the
dominant story Maori people cede sovereignty to the British; in
1840 pressure from humanitarians meant that consent to British
sovereignty fro.mMaori was necessary to legitimate Britain's
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colonisation. However, Maori were unlikely to consent to British
rule. While in the English version of the Treaty Maori clearly
cede sovereignty to the British, the Maori.translation, signed .by
most Maori people, envisions shared government between British
and Maori. The Maori version therefore represents a serious
challenge to the founding unity of the nation-state. Repression
of the Maori version of the Treaty is therefore necessary to the
creation and maintenance of the myth of the unified nationstate.
The British first began to trickle into New Zealand in the
1790s (Rice 1992: 10);2 Maori people from various iwi were there
for 500-1000 years before that (Rice 1992: 6). The British were
soon under pressure from Maori to control their own and from
the French (Orange 1987: 92) who threatened to colonise the
islands ifthe British did not. The New Zealand Association (later
to become the New Zealand Comp~ny) was buying up land from
Maori at great rates in the hopes of making large profits (Rice
1992: 50-51, Orange 1987: 3.3-35). These pressures pushed
Britain towards colonisation, but in order to avoid the colony
becoming a burden on the British taxpayer, it was to be done on
the cheap (Rice 1992: 59). This would be achieved by buying
land from Maori and reselling it at 'greatly enhanced' prices to
settlers (Rice 1992: 58-59). The profit was to be used to run the
colony and to bring a steady stream of settlers to the country.
Political and economic pressures to colonise converged with
the concerns of humanitarians to protect indigenous people. By
the 18305 humanitarian societies in England had reached a peak
ofpaternalistic protectionism'concerned with alleviating the worst
aspects of British expansion, including disease and loss of land
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(Orange 1987:2, Rice 1992: 58, McHugh 1991: 104, 110-111).
The emphasis on protection can be seen as a racket with a price
tag of dependence and willingness to follow the protector's rules. 3
Humanitarians stressed the injustice of claiming Aotearoa for
England without consent from the Maori (Orange 1987: 225-

26).
The British were therefore operating under a combination
of potentially contradictory pressures: first, from ostensibly
humanitarian concerns to protect Maori people, which required
voluntary cession of sovereignty in a Treaty; and contradictorily,
under pressure to obtain land inexpensively from the same Maori
people who were to be protected. As a legal document, the English
version of the Treaty was dearly intended to respond to these
two pressures. It provided the Crown with a right ofpre-emption
on the sale of Maori land which was intended to regularise the
acquisition of land by the Crown for settlers (McHugh 1991:
108-112), and it stated that Maori ceded sovereignty to the
British, satisfying humanitarians that Maori people had consented
to British rule. The two major slippages in the translation which
facilitated the misappropriation ofMaori control over their people
and the their land also closely track these two pressures: the
mistranslation of sovereignty and the misinterpretation of the
pre-emptive right.
The Treaty of Waitangi was drafted and signed in 1840,
after a hasty translation into Maori (Ross 1972 NZJH: 133).
The story ofits translation begins in 1835, in response to a French
threat to attempt to claim New Zealand. At that time a missionary
named Henry Williams encouraged some Maori representatives
to sign a document declaring their national independence and
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sovereignty over New Zealand. In this declaration Williams used
the Maori term mana whenua for 'sovereignty' (Walker 1990:
88).
By 1840 Williams owned 22,000 acres ofland that he had
purchased directly from Maori. Under the British common law
all legitimate title to land is traced back to the Crown (Hackshaw
1989: 99); under British law Williams' title to his land was
therefore secure as against the-Maori from whom he had
purchased, but otherwise potentially uncertain. 4 Under Maori
law, Williams owned his land at the pleasure of the leaders from
whom he had purchased, which was subject to withdrawal
(Walker 1990: 91). Once Maori ceded sovereignty to the Crown,
Williams would have the opportunity to clarifY his tide (Rice
1992: 58), and he was anxious to do so as he had eleven children
for whom he had to provide (Walker 1989: 266). Further, as a
missionary, Williams' would have been subject to humanitarian
pressure for a Treaty evidencing Maori consent to British rule.
The personal and political stakes for all of those involved in the
Treaty translation and signing were great; most stood to gain
more certain title to between 1,000 and 50,000 acres of land
each and stood to maintain and promote their political interests
upon its signing (Walker 1990: 87).
Many of the Maori leaders who signed the declaration of
independence were also present at the signing of the Treaty.
Perhaps as a result ofthe convergence of these pressures, Williams
did not use the recognisable translation of mana whenua for
sovereignty in the Treaty. Rather, he translated the word
'sovereignty' as kawanatanga, a transliteration of 'governor' with

73

Seuffert

a suffix added to become 'governance' (Walker 1990: 90-92, Ross

1972 NZ]H, 140-141).
There is also historical evidence suggesting that Williams
was aware of discrepancies between the legal interpretation of a
right of pre-emption in British law and the interpretation given
to Maori leaders. The English version of-the Treaty ofWaitangi
guaranteed 'exclusive and undisturbed possession' of Maori land
and provided the Queen with an exclusive right of preemption
should Maori wish to sell. Prices were to be agreed between the
Maori owners and representatives of the Queen. This language
was arguably consistent with the common law doctrine ofnative
title which provided that the sovereign of an acquiring state had
an exclusive right ofpre-emption to buy indigenous peoples' land
(Hackshaw 1989: 98). This right provides the Crown with
exclusive access to purchase cheap land. However, it appears that
Williams was aware that 'Maori were told the Queen could have
first offer, after which they could sell to whomever they pleased)
(Rice 1992: 52, Walker 1989: 265, Ross 1972 NZJH: 143-153).
There is no mention in the Maori version ofprohibition on selling
the land to anyone else after offering it to the Crown. One
influential translation ofthe Maori version states that Maori only
agreed to 'sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to' by the two
parties (Kawharau 1989: 320), and Maori protested the
interpretation that they were not to sell to others if the Crown
did not want to buy (Ross 1972 NZJH: 146-147). It has also
been suggested that this mistranslation was deliberate (McHugh
1991: 103).5
With respect to these two aspects oftranslation, the failure
to use mana whenua, and the misinterpretation of the pre-emptive
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right, the most recent Oxford History of New Zealand notes
that:
In comparing the English with the Maori text it becomes
apparent that Henry Williams was not simply trying to translate,
but rather to re-write the Treaty into a form that would be
acceptable to Maori (Rice 1992: 52).

While the Oxford History also suggests that these mistranslations
were blunders rather than deliberate deceptions, that conclusion
seems unfounded. The passage quoted suggests that Williams
knew that use of mana whenua for sovereignty would not have
been acceptable to Maori (Ross 1972 NZJH: 141). Williams
and the other British officials were under severe pressure to get a
Treaty signed hastily (Ross 1972 NZJH: 133-135). His past
experience with the declaration of independence made him
intimately aware of the position of Maori leaders (Ross 1972
NZJH: 139-141). Further, Williams' interest in gaining more
certain title to his land holdings provided him with added urgency
and motive for ensuring that the Treaty was signed. The suggestion
that his translation amounted to deliberate deception is better
supported (Walker 1990: 91, Walker 1989: 269, Ross 1972:20;
Ross 1972 NZJH: 140-141). As Ross argues, '[i]t is difficult not
to conclude that the omission of mana from the test ... was no
accidental oversight' (1972 NZJH: 141).
It has been persuasively argued that Maori leaders would
not have signed a Treaty granting mana whenua to the British
Crown. Discussions of Maori representatives surrounding their
signing of the Maori version of the Treaty indicate that most did
not believe that they were ceding sovereignty, or granting control
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oftheir land to the British (Walker 1990: 91-93). One influential
Maori leader at the time described the effect-of the Treaty ·in the
debates surrounding the signing as 'the shadow of the land goes
to the Queen but the substance remains with us' (Adams 1977:
235). Many Maori saw, heard discussion of, and signed only the
Maori version of the Treaty. In addition, the Treaty guarantees
Maori te tino Rangatiratanga, which can onlybe loosely translated
as Chieftainship over their lands, and control over taonga
(treasures) and resources, such as fishing (Walker 1989: 263269). These guarantees, as well as other copious historical evidence
(Walker 1989: 269), further support the argument that Maori
did not cede sovereignty to the British (Walker 1989: 278).
Rather, it has been argued that British and Maori knew that what
the Maori leaders were agreeing to in the Treaty was the British
coming into the country to govern the British while Maori
retained their traditional control over their land and people
(Williams 1989: 79). This is an interpretation of the Treaty that
is consistent with the use of kawanatanga to indicate governorship.

If Maori leaders would not have ceded mana whenua to
the British, then Williams' appropriative mistranslation was
necessary to the British success in convincing Maori to sign,
necessary to the colonisation of Aotearoa, and necessary to its
formation into a unified nation-state. At this crucial moment of
nation-building, Williams acted in both his own self-interest and
in the interests of unifying the nation-state. It has been argued
that the ideal conception of the good citizen involves the
fulfillment ofthese dual interests, sometimes overlapping (Moore
1998).6 The fulfillment of national and individual interests
simultaneously is also reflected in the nineteenth century ideology
of 'manliness' which provided 'the essence of civic virtue ... [as
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well as] a guide for the little man' (Tosh 1994: 180, Berg 1998:
11-112). Williams' actions mapped his own identity onto a white
masculine ideal of the good citizen/subject (Brown 1994: 157).
His act is also the performance (Butler 1990: 128-141) and
fulfillment of that ideal, and for that moment he closed the gap
between his own identity and the ideal (Naffine 1990: 58-77).
Williams' acts both fulfilled an ideal of citizenship and
were fraudulent or deceptive (Rice 1992: 58)/ This construction
highlights the specificity of the construction of the good citizen,
the content of the actions of the ideal of the good citizen, and
the historical moments at which that ideal is performed.At this
historical moment in the context of the colonisation of New
Zealand and its associated pressures, the ideal good citizen was
deceptive and fraudulent, 'tact, flattery, guile, bluffand a dash of
subterfuge were all part of the diplomatic equipment' (Orange
1987: 91). 8 The point is to see Williams' deceptive actions as
consistent with the perpetuation of the manner in which the
existing historical cantext constructed the good citizen (Gatens
1996: 40), and therefore as an integral aspect ofBritish colonising
culture, not an isolated incident. As I will argue below, not only
was deception and fraudulence integral to British colonising
culture, the British~based law, in specific contexts ofcolonisation,
was also deceptive and fraudulent (Goodrich 1996: 128).
Erasure of the Maori version of the Treaty, and Maori
interpretations of the Treaty is necessary to the unity and closure
of the dominant version of the founding of New Zealand. The
dominant version ofevents subsequent to the signing ofthe Treaty
also attempts to legitimate, by erasing, acts of material violence
which resulted in the decimation of the Maori population, the
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loss of their land an~ th~ colonising and appropriation of their
culture. This erasure leaves space for the reproduction of Maori
people and culture through the prism of the British colonising
system (Mikaere 1994), as a wodding of the world (Spivak 1990;
1).
Paradoxically, these erasures also simultaneously open
readings of the Treaty that blow apart the myth of the unified
nation state, interrupting this momentary closure (Goodrich
1996: 137). ,The acts ofdeception in the translation of the Treaty
form hairline cracks in the unitary foundation of the nation,
capable of splitting apart the foundation. The multiple versions
bf the Treat)" slippages between the versions, and the fissures
opened through translation have provided fertile grounds for over
150 years of crises threatening New Zealand's dominant
(imposed) story of unity. The space opened by these interruptions
is temporarily closed by each re.. enactment of the deceptions and
erasures in three pivotal nation-building cases over the next 150
years. AU three cases involve textual violence which legitimates
material violence, violence both represented by the facts of the
cases and occurring generally as part of colonisation. All three
cases also reflect ruptures in the fiction of unity that signal
perpetual crisis.

III. Law's Deceptions: Repetition With a Difference
In the ISO-odd years since the signing ofthe Treaty, at least three
cases represent crisis in the maintenance of the myth of New
Zealand as a unified nation-state. Each case maintains the fiction
of the unified nation;;:sta.te, and the corresponding fiction of
closure and unity of the law; by erasing and silencing the Maori
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version of the Treaty, repressing and thereby re-enacting the
deception of its appropriative mistranslation. The nature of the
deception changes with the historical context and the particular
crisis. Paradoxically, each case also represents the resurgence of
the story ofdeception ofthe Treaty translation. Re-enactment of
the deception in each case is necessary to the repression of the
Treaty deception, the maintenance of the unified nation-state,
and the continued legitimacy ofthe British legal system, and the
Crown, in New Zealand.
The fir~t two cases represent crisis challenging the on-going
project of colonisation in its unstable infancy. In the first case
the fiction ofclosure of the unity ofthe law is maintained against
a challenge from literature at the same time as the violent unity
of the state is maintained by repressing the Maori version of the
Trea~ both in the interests of colonisation. Contradictorily, the
second case illustrates a convergence oflaw and literature, where
law's illusion of closure is adeptly sacrificed in the interests of
colonisation, and the Maori version of the Treaty is again violently
repressed (Singer 1991: 2-6). The crisis precipitating the third
case occurs much more recently~ but is also a crisis of legitimacy
for the British form of government and its legal system. In this
case the Court simultaneously relegates the deceptions of
colonisation to the past and represents the emancipatory,
victorious present for Maori even while once again fe-enacting
the appropriative mistranslation of the Treat}'-

A. R

V

Symonds

R v Symonds (1847) was ostensibly about protecting Maori from
the confiscation of their lands either by open sales to settlers or
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through the implementation of the wastelands policy. By 1844
the New Zealand colonial project was in crisis: treasury was
bankrupt and under pressure from both colonists wanting to
purchase land, 9 and Maori wanting to sell (Ross 1972 NZ]H:
146, Belgrave 1997: 32). The Governor waived the Crown's
preemptive right to purchase land and allowed direct sales from
Maori to settlers. In 1846 the English Colonial Office issued
new policies regarding ownership ofland (GBPP 1847/763,64).
The policies drew on Locke's argument that the theoretical
justification for ownership of property arises from mixing one's
labour with the land (Locke 1955: ss 25-39). Locke himself
'administered and invested in the imperial system in practice and
justified it in theory' (Tulley 1995: 71). In a move that was a
common tactic of British colonisation, Locke's theoretical
argument was translated into a policy that required indigenous
people to have cultivated land in order to claim ownership (Tully
1995: 70-78). Any Maori land not directly used for cultivation
was classified as 'waste land' belonging to the Crown and stripped
of native title (Hackshaw 1989: 103). The policy was a thinly
veiled confiscation of Maori land; it declared the Crown owner
of Maori land without requiring purchase of the land contrary
to the Treaty guarantee of'exclusive and undisturbed possession'.
In the New Zealand context, where Maori were still a very
powerful force, these directives were inflammatory (Orange 1987:
126-132, Hackshaw 1989: 104).10 By 1846 Maori unrest due to
great loss of land and settler influx was widespread (Williams:
1989: 74). Maori still dominated the country and they were
increasingly unhappy with the imposition of British colonisation
and its implications (Williams 1989: 73, Orange 1987: 126132).11 At a time when the treasury was bankrupt, Governor
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Grey wrote to England warning that any attempt to alienate Maori
land without purchasing it was likely to end in disaster (Hackshaw
1989: 104, Belgrave 1997: 31). The project of colonisation was

.

..

In CrISIS.

In Symonds Governor Grey manufactured a challenge to a
title to land issued under the waiver of the Crown's pre-emptive
right, ensuring that the sales effected under the waiver would be
subject to judicial review. The Court found that the Queen's preemptive right to purchase Maori land could not be waived to
allow purchases directly by settlers from Maori. The Court
declared that this rule was 'founded on the largest humanity'
because- it protected Maori from the 'evil consequences of the
intercourse to which we have introduced them' (Symonds 1847:
391). To allow sales openly to anyone would 'be virtually to
conf.lscate the lands of the natives in a very short time' (Symonds
1847: 391). The Court further stated that the right of preemption was conditional upon Maori agreeing to alienate or sell
their land; without Maori consent native title could not be
extinguished (I847: 390, 394). This statement highlighted the
illegality of the waste lands policy, which extinguished native
title without consent.
On one reading, Symonds is a story of recognition of the
protection due to the Maori people by the Crown and the British
courts. Government reports at the time also recognised that Maori
owned all of New Zealand land under their own laws. This
protection and affirmation is buttressed by an attack ofthe waste
lands policy by the ChiefJustice Martin, one of the judges who
sat in the case, which acknowledged that Maori 'have been
formally recognised as an independent state' (Hackshaw 1989:
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108). Martin also declared that Britain's title to New Zealand
rested solely on the Treaty:
If ever there was a case where the stronger party was obliged by
its position to respect the demands of the weaker, if ever a
powerful country was bound by its engagements with a weaker,
it was the engagement contracted under ... [the Treaty of
Waitangi] with the native chiefs (Martin 1847: 10).

These statements operate to reassure the dominant and restless
Maori of protection for their land and respect for their
autonomous decisions to sell. The project of colonisation is
simultaneously furthered by the quoted statement's emphasis on
characterizing the British as the stronger party and the Maori as
the weaker, at a time when in fact the British could not have
taken the country by force. In a time of crisis in the colonial
project, it is likely that such statements were necessary to both
the legitimacy and the physical reality of continued British
presence in New Zealand.

Symonds is also a story ofthe integrity of the closure oflaw
in the face of a potential tainting from Locke's political theory,
or literature outside of law. The wasteland's policy is directly
contradictory to the common law doctrine of native title, yet
useful to the project ofcolonisation. Locke's philosophical theory
is not law; its potential interpretation into law challenges the
law's positivist fiction of closure and unity. As a result of the
emphatic language in the Symonds case, and the Chief Justice's
'stinging attacl{ 9.n the wastelands policy, it was suspended, but
only for five years (Hackshaw 1989: 108-109).12
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While Symonds may have been a victory for law's fiction of
closure, its construction of native title and the Crown's preemptive right were not victories for Maori. The dubious origin
of the doctrine of native title is asserted in a paradoxical manner
as 'a fundamental maxim of our laws, springing no doubt from
the feudal origin and nature of our tenures...', a claim that the
doctrine is deeply rooted which creates the roots (Symonds 1847:
388). The one seemingly clear precedent cited, the United States
case of Johnson v McIntosh (1823) is not in the direct line of
authority for a New Zealand Court, and its lineage is also open
to challenge: 13
Marshall clearly felt the primary determinant to be the conduct
of the government. The presumption was made that the
government had based its conduct on legal principle and so the
relevant principles were to be found in this conduct (McHugh
1991: 106).14

The presumption that the United States government, or the
Supreme Court, based its conduct in relation to first nations
people in that country on legal principle is itself questionable
(Singer 1991: 3);15 use ofthat precedent to legitimate construction
of the doctrine of native title in New Zealand builds a house of
cards.

Symonds' construction of native title and the right of
preemption is actually the imposition of a severe limitation on
the right of alienation of Maori land as contemplated by the
Maori version of the Treaty (1847: 391, McHugh 1991: 110Ill). The doctrine of native title as constructed by the Court
)trips Maori of full title to their land; its interpretation of the
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pre-emptive right resulted in Maori holding title to land that
was inferior to the BJitish concept of an estate in fee, or full and
absolute dominion over the land (1847: 391). The only reference
to the Maori version of the treaty in the case is a passing one in
which ChiefJustice -Martin states:
with the questions raised as to the true meaning of the Treaty of
Waitangi as it stands in the native language - whether it does or
does not speak of the 'exclusive right ofpre-emption', or of 'preemption' at all, or only and simply of 'purchase' - we have
obviously no concern (1847: 397).

No reason or precedent is given to legitimize this 'obvious' point
(Williams 1989: 80), this passing statement consigns the Maori
version, in which Maori only agreed to provide the Crown with
a first option to purchase land, to silence. This silencing re-enacts
the deception ofthe Treaty's translation. The ChiefJustice's public
statement that the British title in New Zealand rested solely on
the Treaty dearly did not extend to the Maori version of the
Treaty. The Court does state that 'the plaintiff stands in the
Crown's right as it is in the Crown' (1847: 397). The legitimacy
of the'Crown's right must be based in the legitimacy ofthe Maori
version of the Treaty, signed by Maori, which did not provide
the Crown with an exclusive right of pre-emption. It is only by
repressing the Maori version of the Treaty that the Court can
reach its interpretation ofnative title and the Crown's pre-emptive
right, which rob Maori offull title to their land (Belgrave 1997:
32).16 The Court insists on the application of the doctrine of
native title in order to highlight the illegality of the wastelands
policy, which at a moment of crisis in colonisation is necessary
to the continued presence of the British in New Zealand.
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This reading of Symonds foregrounds the deception and
theft (Goodrich 1996: 128, 135-136) effected by the law,
strategies which are necessary to its positivist insistence on the
closure of law and the separation of law from literature, morals
and politics. The Court both passively refuses to consider the
Maori version of the Treaty, re-enacting the deception necessary
to the English version, and simultaneously highlights the illegality
of the wastelands policy. Both moves work in the interests of the
continuing colonisation project.

B. Wi Para'a

V

The Bishop of Wellington

The case of Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (I877) also
works to cl<?se a rupture opened by a crisis in colonisation
involving the confiscation of Maori land. Contrary to the
precedent set in Symonds, in Wi Parata the Court rejects a
common law native title analysis which may have required the
return of land to Maori. Instead it relies on the insistence of a
unified conception ofa sovereign in positivist legal theory (Davies
1996: 64-65) to justify the confiscation of land. It is the breach
of law's fiction of closure by reliance on the literature of legal
theory that has prompted recent academic arguments that the
case was incorrectly decided. 17
During the first decades after the signing of the Treaty
Maori people gifted many pieces ofland to churches in trust for
the purpose of building schools for the local iwi. Few schools
were built. Under the common law of trusts, property placed in
trust for a specific purpose may revert back to the donor if it is
not used for that purpose. However, at a time when the
Government was moving from provincial to national school
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systems, culminating in the Education Act 1877 (Cumming
1978: 65-99), the government wanted control over these lands.
Gaining control required wresting control from the churches,
and eliminating any reversionary rights to the land in the original
Maori donors (Hackshaw 1989: 109). Further, the land gifted
to church-held charities was only one piece of a much bigger
puzzle. By the early 1870s it was clear to Maori that the British
were using any means possble, including war as well as measures
ostensibly intended to protect them, to prise land from their
hold. In response to their dissatisfaction, Maori were encouraged
to use the courts. This suggestion- was vigorously followed
through9-ut the 1870s and by the 1880s more than one thousand
Maori petitions were presented, in many of which the Treaty
figured prominently (Orange 1987: 186). The issues raised in
wt Parata are therefore representative of another crisis in the
colonial project, revealing once again the rift papered over by the
deception of the Treaty translation.
Wi Parata was a leader of N gati Toa who claimed original
ownership ofone of the pieces ofland; this piece had been given
to Bi~hop Selwyn in 1848 for the purposes ofeducating the N gati
Toa children (Wi Parata 1877: 72). In 1850 a Crown grant to
the land was made for purposes that Wi Parata saw as inconsistent
with the purpose for which the land had originally been donated.
He made submissions to a select committee set up to investigate
the matter, asking for return of the land. His submissions were
ignored. While the Select Committee recommended appointment
ofa special commissioner to further investigate (Hackshaw 1989:
109), Wi Parata applied to the Supreme Court for a declaration
that the grant of the land was void because it hadn't been used
for the intended-purposes, and therefore that the land should
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revert to Ngati Toa (Orange 1987: 186). A favourabl,e result for
Ngati Toa may have required return of all land held by similar
religious, educational and chritable trusts, and the government
was aware of this possibility (Orange 1987: 186). ChiefJustice
Prendergast concluded that in New Zealand a Crown grant
extinguished native title and therefore the land could not revert
back to Ngati Toa; this outcome legitimated the Crown in
extinguishing Maori title to land without purchasing it.
Prendergast held that the existence of the guarantees to
exdusive and undisturbed possession of land in the English
version of the Treaty were irrelevant to the outcome of the case.
He drew on positivist legal theory to support his conclusion that
the Treaty was a 'simple nullity.... [because] No body politic
existed capable of making session of sovereign~..'(I 877: 78).
According to Prendergast, Maori people did not constitute an
independent political'society with a sovereign capable of ceding
sovereignty. Austin's legal theory, for example, defines the
sovereign as the unlimited ruler of one united independent
political society (Austin 1955: 193-194). According to Austin,
this means that kinship groups, such as Native Americans, cannot
constitute an independent political society, and therefore cannot
have a sovereign (Austin 1955: 207-211). Prendergast does not
hesitate to state that Maori society did not measure up to Austin's
requirements because Maori were 'barbarians':
The Maori tribes were incapable of performing the duties, and
therefore of assuming the rights, of a civilised community ...
[the] territory [is] thinly populated by barbarians without any
form of law or civil government (1877: 77).
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The appropriative mistranslation ofthe Treaty effected an erasure
of Maori understandings of the Treaty which was perpetrated by
the Symonds Court's refusal to consider the Maori version.
Prendergast's declaration of the Treaty as a nullity, his insistence
on a unitary sovereign, and his construction of Maori as
incomprehensible others, again effects an erasure and a
simultaneous warlding of the world through British colonial
representations (Pocock 1992: 32).
Prendergast's interpretation of native title as extinguished
by Crown grant without purchase is made without reference to
and apparently in contradiction to Symonds; instead of applying
recent legfll precedent the Court relies on recent developments
in positivist legal theory. It is this use of literature in law that
commentators have critiqued, one stating that 'instead of
reflecting established law, [Wi ParataJ reflected untested positivistinspired legal theories...' (Hackshaw 1989: 93). Prendergast has
also been critiqued for reliance on 'academic writers' rather than
legal precedent (McHugh 1991: 113). In its privileging of
positivist legal theory over the law of Symonds, Wi Parata
represents a convergence of law and literature. Paradoxically,
Austin's theory is known for its insistence on the separation of
law fiom morals, politics and literature. While Symonds expunges
Locke)s literature from the law, Wi Parata opportunistically
embraces the literature of legal positivism. Both decisions work
in the interests of colonisation.
David Williams (1989: 65-72) makes a persuasive
argument that colonial judges throughout the British Empire
consistently molded legal doctrine in the interests ofcolonization,
concluding with respect to the Wi Parata case:
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Modern legal scholars tend to be squeamish about such a
transparent molding oflegal doctrine to suit the convenience of
colonial capitalism, and no doubt the colonial judiciary in the
late nineteenth century did 'misunderstand', deliberately or
otherwise, the doctrine ofaboriginal title. Yet ... colonial judges
in many parts of the Empire were adept at reaching decisions
convenient for colonial governments which were at the expense
of indigenous peoples' rights (Williams 1989: 87).

Williams emphasises that WJ Parata's deception was not an isolated
mistake, but rather integral to British law. It legitimates the
material violence of deception and theft related to land
confiscations. Wi Parata is decided after the Maori lands wars
and other violent government acts dispossessing Maori of land
contrary to the Treaty. The return of Ngati Toa land had the
potential to unleash a flood of claims not only for the return of
mis-used trust land, but for large tracts ofland from which Maori
had been dispossessed. The case therefore represented a potential
crisis in the project of colonisation which required declaring the
Treaty a nullity. This case emphasizes that Maori will have no
recourse to the Courts, the proclaimed arbiters and protectors of
justice within the imposed system, for Treaty breaches. The
decision in W7 Parata facilitated the ongoing confiscation ofMaori
land. It legitimated over 100 pieces oflegislation to 'legalise' Maori
dispossession from Maori land; it has been argued that all of
these pieces of legislation were enacted in breach of the Treaty
Oackson 1993: 77).

c. New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General
Socio-legal and political attempts to relegate the Treaty to history
and perpetuate the myth of a unified nation-state throughout
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the 19th and first halfofthe 20th century succeeded in producing
a semblence of unity that was interrupted by repeated crisis.
Possibly the most significant ofthese crises occurred in the 19805,
a watershed decade for New Zealand. Political activism on the
part of Maori increased and diversified. Their claims included
claims to absolute Maori sovereignty made by a number ofvocal,
articulate and powerful Maori women. These political claims were
supported by a growing body of opinion and scholarship
recognising the Maori version of the Treaty as a basic
constitutional document in which Maori retained the right to
govern themselves, 'the question ofthe origins ofthe New Zealand
state became a matter of national concern' (McHugh 1997:43).
As Treaty claims gained purchase among, and support from, the
general population, the New Zealand government faced a crisis
oflegitimacy. This crisis prompted the government and the Court
ofAppeal to focus on the English version of the Treaty in order
to regain legitimacy and re-construct the imposed unity of the
nation state.
In 1984 the Labour Party promised to honour the Treaty
and to settle grievances resulting from the Treaty, and was
consequently elected (Kelsey 1995: 23). In 1985 this government
extended the scope of the powers of the Waitangi Tribunal,
originally empowered to enquire into grievances occurring from
the date ofits creation in 1975, to look at the crisis oflegitimacy
grievances based on the Treaty back to 1840. However, the
Tribunal was not given the power to award remedies; it was
empowered only to make recommendations to the Government.
This Labour government also commenced and accelerated the
movement of the New Zealand economy from one of the most
highly regulated in the world to one of the least regulated,
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dismantling a comprehensive welfare state in the process. In a
move contradictory to its Treaty stance hut consistent with its
monetarist policies, it also commenced the process ofprivatisation
ofstate owed assets, thereby limiting the State's ability to redress
Treaty wrongs.
The State OwnedEnterprises Act 1986 ('SOE'Act) provided
for the formation of quasi-private corporations from previously
state-owned assets and utilities, to which close to 4 million
hectares of land were to be transferred (NZMC 1987: 653). The
assets to be transferred had a book value of $11.8 billion in
government accounts in March of 1986 (Kelsey 1990: 81).
Spurred by an urgent interim report by the Waitangi Tribunal
stating that the 'honour of the Crown was at stake' sections 9
and 27 were inserted into the SOE Act (Kelsey 1990: 83-84).
Section 9 required that the Crown must not exercise its powers
in a manner inconsistent with the 'principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi'. Section 27 provided limited protection from complete
privatisation for resources under dispute in claims filed with the
Waitangi Tribunal prior to passage ofthe Act, hut failed to provide
protection for resources that could be the subject offuture claims
(Kelsey 1993: 253). In New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney
General [1987] the New Zealand Maori Council, an independent
private body, sought a court order to stop the asset transfers. It
claimed that by transferring assets potentially subject to future
Waitangi Tribunal claims, the Crown was exercising its powers
in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. IS
At a time when the constructed unity of the nation
appeared to be in crisis, the story that the President of the Court
ofAppeal writes in this case is one of recognition and validation
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of the Treaty, placing the mistakes and unfortunate incidents of
colonisation in the past (NZMC 1987: 660-661). The Court
states that a refusal to decide whether Parliame~t was· acting in
accordance with the principles ofthe Treat}', when it was required
to do so by section 9 of the Act, (would be unhappily and
unacceptably reminiscent ofan attitude, now past, that the Treaty
itself is of no value to the Maori people' (NZMC 1987: 661).
The decision self-consciously represents the emancipatory present,
in which Maori receive the respect and victory that they deserve,
'the Maori people have succeeded in this case. Some might speak
of a victory, but Courts do nat usually use that kind oflanguage'
(NZMC 1987: 667).
The Court, authorised by section 9 of the Treaty to createl
construct tne principles ofthe Treaty, drew on private law priciples
(McHugh 1997: 50-51) in stating that (the Treaty signified a
partnership between the races' (NZMC 1987: 664). This
partnership required the determination of 'what steps should be
taken by the Crown, as a partner acting towards the Maori partner
in the utmost good faith which is the characteristic obligation of
partnership' (1987: 664). The partnership created duties
'ana1<?gous' to fiduciary duties and these duties extended also to
Maori, who had (undertaken a duty ofloyalty to the Queen, full
acceptance ofher Government through her responsible Ministers,
and reasonable co-operation' (1987: 666). The court concluded
that if the Crown 'acting reasonably and in good faith' was satisfied
that particular assets would not be subject to future claims, then
transfer of those assets would not be in breach of the principles
of the Treaty (1987: 664). The Court refused to find that there
could be a general duty on the government to consult Maori
when making decisions under the SOE Act (1987: 665).
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While the Court explicitly markets the case as progressive,
enlightened and a victory for Maori, the Maori version of the
Treaty, as in Symonds and Wi Parata, is irrelevant to its outcome.
The Court states:
The principles of the Treaty are to be applied, not the literal
words.... The story of the drafting of the Treaty and the
procurement of signatures from more than 500 Maori chiefs,
including some Maori women of appropriate rank - events in
which no lawyer seems to have played a part - is an absorbing
one, but not within the ambit of this judgment (1987: 662).

While purporting to interpret the principles of the Trea~ and
using the language of partnership, the Court effectively ignored
popular and scholarly support for recognition ofthe Maori version
ofthe Treaty and its vision ofdual governments. Maintenance of
the fiction ofNew Zealand as a unified nation-state at an historical
moment when the fissures in that unity were showing was crucial.
That maintenance required a violent repressing of the earlier
deceptions integral to its formation. 19 At an historical moment
when the deceptions in the formation ofthe state are highlighted
by the political action of Maori, and the Court is explicitly
empowered to· consider the Treaty, the opening for the practice
ofjustice in the repetitions of the law is perhaps the widest. This
opening provides the Court with an ethical moment in which it
chooses (0 re-enact the deceptions oftheTreaty signing by refusing
to consider the Maori version. These deceptions are not marginal
asides in the dominant story, they are integral to that story both the building ofunity and the maintenance ofNew Zealand
as a nation-state requires violent deception and theft; these are
the qualities upon which the state is founded and perpetuated.
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IV. Conclusion
The founding moments of New Zealand as a nation state are
marked by acts of deception; these acts provide the content of
the ideal (white, male) citizen acting in both his own self-interest
and interests of nation building. The repression of these acts of
deception in pivotal caSes become law's deceptions; the resurfacing
ofthe deception in the cases requires repetition but repetition is
never only repeating, it always opens space for the exercise of
ethical decisions and the pr;;tctice ofjustice. Thus the deceptions
in the founding moments of the nation state become law's
deceptions as the law re-silences and recreates and founding
moments and" the unified nation state. The deception of the
appropriative mistranSlation of the Treaty of Waitangi and its
reproduction is integral to the project and culture of British
colonialism.
The ideal citizen not only acts in both his own and the
nation's interests simultaneously, he is also forward gazing,
without a history; he is always able to shed his history. The
Government of New Zealand is currently in the process of
attempting to shed what have been termed 'historical' Treaty
grievances through a series ofTreaty settlements (Mikaere 1997:
425). The government has marketed this process to non-Maori
in part through a promise that 'the finality of the process would
enable all New Zealanders to look ahead without the constant
threat ofMaori claims looming on or over the horizon to interfere
with non-Maori and government development' (Mikaere 1997:
425). Annie Mikaere makes a persuasive argument that not only
has the New Zea~~n4government da"imed to fully and finally
settle Treaty grievances in the past without success, but that the
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Canadian and American models for the current settlements have
been dismal failures (Mikaere 1997). There is no reason to think
that application of these models in New Zealand will have
different outcomes. She concludes that these settlements are
another move in the colonial project of assimilation.
My reading of the Treaty's deceptions and three pivotal
cases supports Mikaere's conclusions. The deceptions necessary
and integral to the founding of New Zealand have resulted in
the Treaty grievances which the government is currently
attempting to settle. Those deceptions cannot be addressed fully
and finally without revisiting the violent unity that they found
and perpetuate. Attempting to settle Treaty grievances with
strategies that perpetuate the violent unity of the nation state, a
unity based on deceptions, can only result in a unity perpetually

.
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Notes
'[T]he literary critic must read the literature of the law through
the evidence ofits absence, thr~ugh its repetitions and through
the failures which indicate the return of that which is repressed
in law' (Goodrich 1996: 113).
2

Captain James Cook's first expedition exploring New Zealand
took place in 1769-1770: Sealers, whalers and traders arrived
from the 1790s onwards (Rice 1992: 28).

3

Protection emerges as a theme not only with respect to
justifications for the Treaty, but also in the cases. 'Whether one
is dealing with the state, the Mafia, parents, pimps, police or
husbands, the heavy price ofinstitutionalized protection is always
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a measure of dependence and agreement to abide by the
protector's rules' (Brown 1995: 169).
4

According to British colonial law the Crown always owns the
underlying radical title to land and where feudalism has been
introduced, also the legal title to the land (ultimately all title to
land is traced to a Crown grant), which is burdened by tribal
title. In New Zealand in 1840 settlers were prohibited from
purchasing land directly from Maori; all such purchases were in
jeopardy from the time that the British began to consider
colonisation. A commission was established to investigate and
validate purchases directly from Maori that pre-dated the
declaration ofsovereignty; this investigation was fiercely opposed
(McHugh: 1991: 98, 103-104, 109). (But see Tully 1995: 152154 arguing that the principle that the title to all land can be
traced to the Crown is a fiction).

5

'It has even been intimated that the Crown's representatives
deliberately misused a word normally defined by lawyers as a
"right of first refusal" to mean an exclusive right. A right of
preemption normally has that former meaning in English law,
and there is evidence to suggest that this was the same meaning
understood by the signatory chiefs' (McHugh 1991: 103, citing
Ross 1972: 129, Orange 1987: 42).

6

This theoretical point is well illustrated in the New Zealand
context, where settlers' increasing demands for land were satisfied
by almost any means, often involving the participation of those
with individual interestsjn land in government-sponsored and
legally validated theft, deception and violence, (Rice 1992: 209).
'Maori had lost land by confiscation (Waikato, Bay of PIent}',
and Taranaki), by unfair purchase in the South Island, and by
the equally improper pressures exerted through the Native Land
Court throughout the North Island' (Rice 1992: 290).
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7

'New Zealand exhibited its share of the mismanagement, both
public and private, associated with the exploitation of new
European colonies'.

8

Orange also quotes a newspaper account at the time, (For the
good people at home, the ... [signing ofthe Treatyl was made to
assume the appearance ofone ofthe purest pieces ofphilanthropy
on the part of England in favour of the natives to protect them
against European aggression; but the simple truth is, disguise it
as we may, that under this cloak of benevolence, has been
practiced the greatest hypocriS}T, to obtain the country honestly,
if possible, but, nevertheless to obtain i':' (1987: 91 citing Bay
of Islands Observer, 7 July, 1842).

9

As the Crown was increasingly reluctant to colonise new territory
in the 19th century due to the costs ofadministration, budgetary
implications were closely scrutinised and Governors of these
lands often hard-"pressed for cash and under pressure from
colonists for land (Hackshaw 1989: 103, Orange 1987: 30-31).

10

On the North Island many Pakeha (including Henry Williams)
were against the land provisions ofthe Royal Instructions because
they were aware of their injustice and the likely responses of
Maori; Orange notes that they were concerned to· protect the
general welfare of the colony and their own positions and work
(Orange 1987: 126-132).

11

'[I]n the 840s the political and military power in the hands of
Maori tribes severely circumscribed the options available to the
government' (Williams 1989: 73).

12

Suspension of the waste lands policy was the only manner in
which to ensure continued British presence in New Zealand; it
was also consistent wi~h Hobson's instructions to use mildness
and sincerity to overcome distrust produced by the British
encroachment and to at first buy" land for British settlers that
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the Maori could sell without distress to themselves (Williams
1989: 74; Walker 1990: 90).
13

'The first significant judicial pronouncement on the status of
tribal land rights is traditionally accredited to the Supreme Court
ofAmerican under Chief]ustice MarshalL These cases, decided
soon after the War ofIndependence and Confederation, remain
important today' (emphasis added) (McHugh 1991: 106). If
the US cases are the first pronouncement, and after the American
revolution US Supreme Court cases are not technically precedent
for New Zealand courts, then Symonds is creating new law.
Although a New Zealand official announcing the prohibition
of sales directly fr9m Maori to settlers stated, 'the right of preemption by the government was the law of England, and the
law also of the colonizing Powers of Europe, before it was the
law of the United States; and the Americans themselves profess
to derive it from the English' (emphasis added) the word profess
may be crucial (McHugh 1991: 109).

14

The Court states the basis for the decision: 'principles ofabstract
justice, which the Creator of aU things has impressed on the
mind of his creature Man, ... [and] those principles also which
our government has adopted in the particular case, and given
us as the rule for our decision' «(1823) 8 Wheat 543 at 572).

15

'Singer notes, for example, that 'the Supreme Court maintained
a fundamental disjunction between legal treatment of Indian
and non-Indian propert}'- This distinction has not worked to
the benefit of Indian nations or individual tribal members. On
the contrary, fee interests owned by non-Indians are subject to
various kinds oflega! protection which the Court denies to tribal
property and to restricted trust allotments owned by tribal
members .... The commitment to individual dignity and restraint
oftyrannical governmental power purportedly underlying nonIndian property law does not appear to extend fully to Indian
,
owners.
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16

Similarly Governor Grey argued at this time to Earl Grey that
'recognition of broad rights to land was crucial to getting any
wastelands for Crown disposal' (Belgrave 1997: 32).

17

'[I]nstead of reflecting established law, {Wi ParataJ reflected
untested positivist-inspired legal theories...' (Hackshaw 1989:
93); '[T]he work done recently by academic writers ... appears
to leave no doubt that since the late 1870s successive New
Zealand judges have misunderstood the law ... on the whole
they did indeed get in wrong' (Brookfield 1989: 10); but
compare 'Modern legal scholars tend to be squeamish about
such a transparent moulding of legal doctrine to suit the
convenience of colonial capitalism, and no doubt the colonial
judiciary did 'misunderstand', deliberately or otherwise, the
doctrine of aboriginal title ... colonial judges in manyparts of
the Empire were adept at reaching decisions convenient for
colonial Governments which were at the expense ofindigenous
people's rights' (Williams 1989: 87). Others still argue for W'i
Paratas interpretation of the Treaty today, 'In its clarity of
exposition, and basic soundness of judgment, it is fitting
testimony to the quality of that most learned Chief Justice's
judicial work' (Chapman 1991: 291).

18

The Court of Appeal required the government to develop a
system to protect all assets subject to Waitangi Tribunal claims
in the process of privatisation (NZMC 1987: 666-668),
indicating that the limited protections in section 27 would be
sufficient (NZMC 1987: 660).

19

'[T]he judge either acts reactively with a resentful passivity
towards death and so reproduces a past state ofaffairs according
to 'grave sentences' already handed down, or the judge acts
affirmtive1y and creatively and suspends those sentences so as to
do justice in the face of fortune' (Goodrich 1996: 18I).
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